Rule makers and rule takers: On volkspartei adaptation and strategy by Lees, Charles
        
Citation for published version:
Lees, C 2010, 'Rule makers and rule takers: On volkspartei adaptation and strategy', German Politics, vol. 19,
no. 1, pp. 89-104. https://doi.org/10.1080/09644001003588747
DOI:
10.1080/09644001003588747
Publication date:
2010
Document Version
Peer reviewed version
Link to publication
This is an Author's Accepted Manuscript of an article published inLees, C 2010, 'Rule makers and rule takers:
On volkspartei adaptation and strategy' German Politics, vol 19, no. 1, pp. 89-104, copyright Taylor & Francis,
available online at: http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/09644001003588747
University of Bath
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 07. Dec. 2019
Rule Makers and Rule Takers: On Volkspartei Adaptation and Strategy. 
 
CHARLES LEES, Department of Politics, University of Sheffield (UK) 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
The last three decades has seen a steady electoral decline in the Volksparteien, 
culminating in the historically low share of the vote garnered by the CDU/CSU and SPD 
in the 2009 federal election.  Despite this low vote share, and the poor performance of 
the SPD in particular, this article argues that party system change has in many ways 
enhanced the coalition options available to the Volksparteien.  However, with reference 
to the notion of path-dependence and the associated role of rules, norms, and beliefs in 
locking-in standard operating procedures, the article argues that the CDU/CSU is better 
placed than the SPD to take advantage of these new strategic options.  This is because 
the CDU/CSU has been and remains more capable of shaping German party politics, 
whereas the SPD has internalised a more reactive role.  The article examines why this is 
the case and discusses how the SPD might overcome path-dependence and, in doing so, 
transform its strategic prospects. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The outcome of the 2009 federal election saw the combined vote of the two Volksparteien 
(catch all parties) fall to an historic low of 56.8 per cent.  This was down 12.6 per cent from the 
combined 69.4 per cent share they won in the 2005 election and a pale shadow of the 
overwhelming support the Volksparteien enjoyed over the eight elections from 1961 through to 
1987, in which they consistently won over 80 per cent of the vote and, in 1976, managed to gain 
91.2 per cent of the vote.  Indeed, the 2009 result was even worse than the 60.2 per cent of the 
total vote share that the CDU/CSU and SPD won in 1949, before the consolidation of the party 
system began. 
 
On the face of it, the 2009 election result is deeply worrying for the two Volksparteien.  The 
CDU/CSU only won 33.8 per cent of the vote, down 1.4 per cent on the 2005 election and way 
down on the 50.2 per cent won in 1957.  For its part, the SPD only won 23 per cent of the vote, 
down 11.2 per cent from 2005 and even further from its best electoral performance of 45.8 per 
cent in 1972.  Moreover, the 2009 election saw the three smaller parties within the German party 
system all make gains: the Greens won 10.7 per cent (up from 8.1 per cent in 2005), the Left 
Party 11.9 per cent (up from 8.7 per cent in 2005) and, most notably, the FDP won 14.6 per cent 
(well up from 9.8 per cent in 2005).  Such a shift in the relative weights of the parties arguably 
does have some impact on what has become the de facto constitutional role of the Volksparteien.  
Article 21 of the Basic Law states that ‘political parties shall participate in the formation of the 
political will of the people’ and the Volksparteien, more than other political parties, have 
internalised this integrative function to such an extent that any perceived loss of public support 
for them has direct implications for wider system support.  A more sanguine view, however, is to 
regard the decline of the Volkspartei vote as indicative of the emergence in the Federal Republic 
of a ‘fluid party system’1, reflecting broader changes in a society that is more diverse, pluralistic, 
and de-aligned than was the case in the past (see Dalton and Weldon in this Special Issue). 
 
A full coverage of this debate is beyond the scope of this article.  The article does, however, 
work from the somewhat counter-intuitive premise that in strategic terms the changes noted 
above can potentially enhance the strategic position of the Volksparteien in the coalition game.  
This premise has been elaborated on in more depth elsewhere2 but, to sum up, it works from the 
argument that, despite their relative electoral strength in the 1960s and 1970s, the Volksparteien 
were nearly always forced to bargain with the FDP, which acted as the ‘kingmaker’ within the 
party system and consequently punched far above its weight in the coalition game.  By contrast, 
the emergence of the Greens and the PDS (later the Left Party) means that, in most instances, 
no single small party can now act as kingmaker in this fashion.  In addition, because of their 
relative positions in ideological space, the small parties would have difficulty acting in concert to 
extract concessions from the Volksparteien.  Thus, even when smaller parties perform 
extraordinarily well (as the FDP undoubtedly did in 2009), the Volksparteien are in principle less 
vulnerable to threats of a decisive defection by small parties to alternative coalitions. 
 
But the reader will note the use of the word potentially.  For although we might discern political 
opportunities within a certain set of structural attributes it cannot be in a deterministic fashion 
and it is down to political agents to (1) identify these attributes as political opportunities rather 
than threats; (2) possess the political skills and acumen effectively to pursue these opportunities; 
and (3) enjoy sufficient resources (be it political authority, electoral and legislative support, or 
even sheer luck) to overcome the inevitable constraints on agents’ strategic potential.  When all 
three of these factors are in alignment then agents are able to, as it were, ‘make the political 
weather’: a point we shall return to in the conclusion to this article.  However, to demonstrate 
how far short of this ideal political agents can fall, consider the fate of the SPD over the period 
2005-2009. 
 
The SPD went into the 2005 federal election in some disarray.  Indeed, the election had been 
called a year earlier than scheduled after the incumbent Chancellor Gerhard Schröder contrived 
to lose a vote of no confidence in order to wage a Lagerwahlkampf to re-establish discipline within 
the SPD, head off a rebellion by the left of the party’s parliamentary party, and also deny the 
PDS and the newly formed ‘Electoral Initiative for Social Justice’, or WASG, the time to merge 
and consolidate a genuinely ‘national’ party3.  Yet the outcome of the 2005 election produced a 
relatively benign institutional configuration for the SPD in the new Bundestag.  The SPD had 
won 222 seats, only four behind the CDU/CSU, controlled the median legislator within a 
legislature with a left majority, and as a result enjoyed more feasible coalition options than the 
CDU/CSU.  Moreover, the eventual coalition agreement between the CDU/CSU and SPD dealt 
the SPD a strong hand in the division of ministerial portfolios, an outcome that seemed to 
reflect the strong strategic position enjoyed by the SPD4.  Yet, if the SPD was indeed dealt such 
a strong hand in 2005, it played that hand abominably.  In the following four years as junior 
member of the Grand Coalition the SPD was comprehensively outflanked by its senior coalition 
partner – and, in particular, by Chancellor Angela Merkel – underwent a string of leadership 
crises, and endured a protracted fall in its opinion poll ratings, culminating in the historic 
electoral disaster described above.  Elements of this cumulative misfortune, such as the impact 
of the global financial crisis (from which centre-left parties across Europe signally failed to derive 
any electoral advantage) or even the ill-health that ended the short-lived leadership of Matthias 
Platzeck, were beyond the SPD’s control but, nevertheless, on balance it was the architect of 
most of it.  Or perhaps ‘architect’ is the wrong word, for what seemed to characterise the SPD - 
in its failure either constructively to engage with the Left Party or to formulate an electorally 
attractive centrist narrative, its lack of emotional appeal to its core working class voters, its 
inability to counter the ‘rhetorical social democratisation’ of the CDU/CSU under Angela 
Merkel’s leadership5, or its nomination of the decent but uncharismatic Frank-Walter Steinmeier 
as Chancellor-Candidate – was an extraordinary passivity, bordering on fatalism.  In short, unlike 
the CDU/CSU, the SPD seemed not only unable but also unwilling to make the political 
weather. 
 
This article explores why this might be the case.  It argues that, partly through luck and good 
fortune, but also through a clearer strategic calculus and an ability to shape political events rather 
than merely react to them, the CDU/CSU is, and has historically been, a more effective political 
competitor than the SPD.  The key to why this is the case lies in the related notions of 
institutional lock-in and path-dependence.  In short, the article argues that at key junctures in the 
institutional development of the Federal Republic, the CDU/CSU has not only successfully 
identified the political opportunities inherent within these junctures but also possessed the 
political acumen and resources to pursue those opportunities.  It will be argued that such 
junctures, such as during the period of Allied Occupation and subsequent foundation of the 
Federal Republic or the collapse of the GDR regime and subsequent unification process, not 
only set up or re-enforced a set of institutional structures, but also buttressed the beliefs, rules, 
norms, and standard operating procedures (SOPs) that underpin those structures and mould 
their development going forward.  Thus, in playing the decisive role in these junctures and the 
early moves associated with them, the CDU/CSU was not only better placed to work with the 
grain of institutional practice going forward but also to shape or, when necessary, even break 
with patterns of path-dependence.  By contrast, and with the important exception of Brandt’s 
Ostpolitik, the SPD was forced into and, it is argued, has internalised and continues to pursue a 
reactive role within the Federal Republic’s political system.  In the language of Wolfgang Streeck 
and Kathleen Thelen, therefore, the CDU/CSU are more often than not the ‘rule makers’, whilst 
the SPD tend to be the ‘rule takers’6. 
 
The rest of the article is structured as follows.  In the next section, the notion of path-
dependence and its impact on institutional agents is discussed.  Through reference to the 
evolutionary economics literature, I adapt a framework of path dependence that is not over-
deterministic, allows for significant political agency and change, and develop an organising 
narrative that is used later in the article.  Second, the article provides an historic overview of the 
roles of the Volksparteien within this rule making/rule taking format and builds upon the point 
made above about the SPD’s reactive role in German politics.  Third, I return to our framework 
of path dependence and a discussion about the persistence of SOPs, which actors they benefit 
and why, and how, in the context of the SPD’s relative strategic weakness, path-dependence 
might be overcome by political agents. 
 
INSTITUTIONS, PATH-DEPENDENCE AND POLITICAL AGENCY 
There is no agreement as to the manner in which agents interact with institutions.  Rational 
actor-centred approaches 7  regard institutions as artefacts of ‘congealed tastes’ 8  or, in those 
accounts where institutional context is more privileged, as ‘prescriptions’ for strategic action9. 
Such ‘thin’ accounts of institutions have parsimonial elegance but, for students of German 
politics, they force us to discount too much of the warp and weft of politics in the Federal 
Republic that make our field of study so rich.  On the other hand, constructivist, sociological, 
and normative institutionalist approaches reverse the polarity of analysis and foreground 
established practices, beliefs, and values as profound constraints on agency.  This notion of a 
‘logic of appropriateness’10 is intuitive and plausible but also imposes a priori limits on the extent 
of transformative change brought about by strategic actors within institutional settings.  In the 
context of the study of German politics it is, as it where, the reification of the Sonderweg narrative 
and therefore equally unhelpful. 
 
In addition, although both the rational choice and normative institutionalist approaches have 
analytical power they attach little importance to how and why institutional settings, principles, 
and practices emerged in the Federal Republic, for instance, in the first place.  Insights from the 
Europeanisation literature 11 , for example, demonstrate that institutional consolidation and 
change is complex and non-linear, marked by a ‘complex causality’12.  We find similar degrees of 
nuance within historical institutionalist narratives 13  in which institutions’ evolution 14  is 
occasionally marked by ‘punctuations’ or junctures in which ‘rapid bursts of change [are] 
followed by long periods of stasis’.15  Thus these accounts stress how the practices - and the 
rules, norms, and beliefs in which they are embedded - that are in place at the time of 
institutional formation persist over the long run.  As a result SOPs develop that serve to 
routinise activities and cultivate incremental rather than fundamental change.  This incremental 
process is not, however, set in stone and we can observe junctures in which institutions undergo 
rapid change.  Thus, despite a bias towards inertia, institutions do adapt over time, either because 
of changes in the external environment, and changes in internal perceptions of the real or 
perceived performance of such institutions in the context of the environment in which they 
operate. Nevertheless, it requires agency – be it individual or collective, goal-directed or 
dispersed and cumulative – to over overcome path-dependency. 
 
This understanding of path-dependency is not a fatalistic and/or deterministic notion in which 
structure inevitably takes precedence to agency.  In fact, a careful reading of the notion of path-
dependency reveals a marked leaning towards the contingent over the deterministic.  The 
concept is associated with evolutionary economics16, which challenges the neo-classical paradigm 
of market clearance and utility maximising individuals.  In doing so, it argues that markets – as 
the aggregate of agents’ actions - make errors in their choice of products and that these initial 
errors are ‘locked in’ through a process of ‘positive feedback’.17  And although the notion of 
lock-in implies sub-optimal collective outcomes, it does not necessarily imply irrational choices 
on the part of agents, given the incentives and information available to them. 
 In order to operationise the notion of path-dependence in the context of Volkspartei adaptation 
and strategy, the article draws upon the debates covered above and makes the distinction 
between ‘structure-driven’ and ‘rule-driven’ path dependence. 18 .  Structure-driven path 
dependence, as the name implies, exists where existing structures impact on the choice and 
evolution of subsequent structures.  This might be for reasons of efficiency or because of rent 
seeking on the part of agents.  And in the case of rent seeking, the incentives to retain the status 
quo are powerful, even when it is clear that the institution has ceased to be efficient.  Similarly, 
rule-driven path dependence exists when the emergence of rules and practices is shaped by 
existing power relationships and their path-dependence is grounded either in reasons of 
efficiency or because public-regarding decisions are thwarted by interest group politics.  For the 
purpose of our analysis, our notion of rules is expanded to include informal rules, norms, 
practices and SOPs, in so far as they can be judged to have a material effect on party competition 
and coalition outcomes.  The two types of path dependence and the reasons for their persistence 
are summarised in Table One. 
 
TABLE ONE ABOUT HERE 
 
Bebchuck and Roe’s typology has considerable empirical and analytical potential.  In empirical 
terms it allows us to distinguish between formal institutions and structures on the one hand and 
the principles and practices associated with political action.  And in analytical terms, it allows us 
to take into account the impact of political agency.  I return to this schema later in the article. 
 
RULE-MAKING AND RULE-TAKING IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
As already noted, the period of Allied occupation from 1945-1949 was when the key early moves 
in the institutional development of the Federal Republic were set in train.  And it was in these 
early moves, especially during the Allied occupation itself, that the organisation and political 
preferences of the CDU/CSU was forged and became dominant.  Political actors on what 
German political commentators refer to as the ‘bourgeois’ side of the party system rejected 
narrow Conservatism in favour of establishing a right-of-centre, cross-class, cross-confessional 
party, drawn from a heterogeneous set of political milieus.19  The impact of this heterogeneity 
within the new party could be seen in its developing programmatic profile (with the emphasis 
more on the ‘Christian’ than on ‘Democracy’ in the ascendant Catholic west and south) and also 
in the highly personal power struggle between Adenauer, based in Cologne, and Jakob Kaiser, 
based in Berlin.  But in what was to be a crucial early move in the institutional development of 
the Federal Republic, the resolution of the CDU’s internal party conflict was intimately entangled 
with the consolidation of power relations and political economy in the wider polity.  Thus the 
successful currency reform and subsequent adoption of Erhard’s economic policies in the 
Western zones of occupation was both reflected in and a reflection of Adenauer’s ascendancy 
over Jakob Kaiser, whose increasing isolation in beleaguered West Berlin was both real and 
metaphorical.20 
 
It can be argued, therefore, that the CDU/CSU that formed the first government of the new 
Federal Republic was also its key architect and that the consequences of its preferences and 
actions would shape the political action arena going forward.  Thus, party, state, and society all 
displayed a socially-conservative, pro-free market profile and, despite cross-confessional 
aspirations, a pronounced Catholic bias in as far as social theory underpinned institutional 
design, policy-making and political economy.  To borrow and slightly stretch a concept from 
critical realism, it was a strongly morthogenic relationship21 that became more pronounced over 
time, as the Cold War, the Economic Miracle of the 1950s and early 1960s, as well as Adenauer’s 
personal acumen and charisma not only enabled the Union parties to widen their support and 
consolidate their hold on power but also re-established Germany as a major European player.  
For as long as the positive feedback between party, state, and society was maintained there was 
no need to challenge established SOPs.  Thus, up until the late 1960s, the CDU/CSU remained 
little more than a Kanzlerwahlverein (party that existed to elect the Chancellor) rather than the 
professionalised party organisation it is today. 
 
What is striking, however, is that when the CDU/CSU went into opposition in 1969 it was 
relatively quick, despite being an organisation with a record of success behind it and therefore a 
strong narrative and rationale to defend SOPs, to react to failure and adapt to the new 
circumstances.  This process actually began before 1969, with the formulation of the Berlin 
Programme of 1967/8, and continued through the 1973 Hamburg conference to the adoption of 
the 1978 Basic Programme.  In a pattern that would be repeated again at the time of unification, 
the CDU either implicitly accepted or explicitly co-opted those elements of the 1970s Federal 
Republic (such as growing social diversity or the process of Ostpolitik) that it could not change 
and, in as far as it could, made them its own.  And in terms of organisational renewal, the CDU 
moved away from the previously loose union of state parties towards a more professional and 
centralised structure.  As a result of this organisation renewal, the party’s Federal Executive and 
Federal Committee were given enhanced powers and the General Secretary was provided with a 
well resourced central apparatus which not only possessed co-ordinating capacity but also a 
policy-making function.  In addition, party financing was restructured and there was a push to 
increase and extend the scope of party membership.22  As a result, when the CDU returned to 
government in 1982 it possessed an efficient party machine and had boosted its membership 
from around 400,000 to over 750,000.23 
 
Moving on a decade, the CDU’s reactive capacity and morphogenetic qualities was also 
demonstrated in its response to the collapse of the Communist regime in the GDR.  On the face 
of it, this looked like an uphill task.  At the start of the process, the incumbent Black-Yellow 
coalition, led by Helmut Kohl, was unpopular, about to enter a federal election year and under 
increasing pressure from a resurgent SPD.  In addition, the CDU’s eponymous sister party in the 
GDR was part of the so-called ‘block-party’ system and, as a result, was deeply implicated both 
collectively and individually in the injustices of the old GDR regime.  Yet, the CDU - and 
Chancellor Kohl in particular - showed an unexpected capacity to seize upon and shape events.  
Within a month of the opening-up of the inter-German border, Kohl had put forward his ten-
point programme for unification and was instrumental in the creation of Allianz für Deutschland, 
consisting of the East German CDU, the German Social Union (backed by the Bavarian CSU), 
and Democratic Awakening (the conservative wing of the East German dissident movement), 
which was successfully to fight the Volkskammer election of March 1990. 
 
The CDU/CSU’s co-option and shaping of the process of unification contrasted with the SPD’s 
more honest but ultimately self-defeating scepticism.  Thus, in a pattern reminiscent of the 
foundation of the Federal Republic, the CDU/CSU’s ideology and political style became 
intimately enmeshed with the dominant political narrative of the new unified Germany.  This not 
only had consequences for the direction of travel in policy terms but also had a significant 
structural impact: both upon the preferences of individual voters in what were now the new 
federal states and, as a result, upon the shape of party politics in post-unification Germany.  This 
impact was visible as early as the 1990 Volkskammer election, in which an ‘inverted social profile’ 
in voting behaviour was already evident.  This was also to be seen in the 1990 Bundestag 
election, in which the CDU enjoyed disproportionate support amongst manual workers 
compared with its overall share of the vote: polling 49.8 per cent compared with 41.8 per cent 
overall (and 24.8 per cent for the SPD).  In addition, the CDU not only led the SPD amongst 
Catholic voters but also commanded a majority of voters with affinity to the Protestant church.24  
The only section of the population in which the SPD was ahead of the CDU was amongst those 
sections of the electorate that claimed no religious affiliation, but here it had to compete with the 
Greens and, more significantly given its present predicament, the PDS.  This trend continued in 
the 1994 Bundestag election, in which the CDU still polled four per cent more of the manual 
worker vote than the SPD.  The reduced margin of CDU dominance indicated that industrial 
workers were returning slowly to what Padgett described as their ‘natural political home’25 but 
the party still benefited from a distinct form of the confessional cleavage in the new federal 
states.  This took two forms, both of which worked to the advantage of the CDU.  First, the 
small numbers of Catholic voters in the eastern states were more likely to vote CDU than SPD 
than their counterparts in the western states and, second, Protestant voters in the east were also 
far more likely to vote CDU rather than SPD.26 
 
By the time of the 1998 Bundestag election, the impact of these initial electoral anomalies was 
less pronounced and the SPD, through inner-party initiatives such as Arbeitsgruppe Ost, had 
engaged with the need to win over voters in the new eastern states.27  Nevertheless, the point 
remains that the SPD’s 1998 strategy was an exercise in catch-up and that the CDU’s penetration 
of the new eastern electorate during the early moves in the development of the all-German polity 
had disproportionate weight and generated three major lock-in effects.  First, it prevented the 
SPD from reviving and consolidating what had historically been its political heartland.  Second, 
as a result, the eastern states remained politically marginal territory in which the CDU was a 
major player (and from which, of course, it would eventually recruit the current federal 
Chancellor).  Finally, it provided the political space to the left of the party system for the 
consolidation of the PDS and, through this, the eventual emergence of the Left Party as a major 
competitor on the left flank of the SPD.  
 
None of these were happy outcomes for the SPD and echoed, albeit in a minor key, the manner 
in which it found itself on the wrong side of history immediately after 1945.  If, as already 
discussed, the new Federal Republic was conceived in the image of the CDU and its emergence 
was only made possible by the process that led to the division of Germany over the period 1945-
1949, then the key political loser in that process was the SPD.  On the one hand, it was the loser 
in a very direct fashion, through the so-called Zwangsvereinigung (forced unification), in which the 
faction of the SPD under Russian occupation, led by Otto Grotewohl, merged with the 
Communist KPD to form the SED.  The direct consequences of this merger need no further 
elaboration or discussion.  On the other hand, it was the loser in a more nuanced manner; 
through the polarisation of German and, indeed, international politics that the Zwangsvereinigung 
represented.  This is worth exploring further. 
 
It would be a mistake to either interpret the majority SPD’s rejection of merger with the KPD as 
a vote of confidence in the emerging political and economic settlement in Bizonia or to view the 
subsequent post-split party as anything like the moderate Catch-all party the SPD is today.  With 
regard to the first point, the SPD’s limited leverage over events in those early years reflected its 
lack of an effective champion amongst the occupying powers.  The newly merged SED 
obviously had the full support of the Soviet Union and the United States provided crucial 
support to the CDU/CSU, as it did to Christian Democratic parties elsewhere in Western 
Europe.  By contrast, although the SPD had the support of the British Labour Government, the 
United Kingdom’s powers were clearly in decline and the SPD’s nationalism, neutrality, and 
resistance to the division of Germany also clashed with the direction of British Foreign policy as 
pursued by UK Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin.  And with the return to power in London of a 
Conservative Government in 1951, the ongoing fraternal ties that the SPD enjoyed with the 
Labour Party were of less importance than they had been in the 1940s.  Moving on to the second 
point, the SPD was slow to adapt to the changed conditions described above, even though by 
the early 1950s the party was clearly swimming against the tide.  The SPD remained a Marxist-
inspired mass party and it took a decade for the party to come to terms with the division of 
Germany and the social market model established by Adenauer and Erhard, with the 
encouragement of the USA.  In these early years of the Federal Republic, the SPD continued to 
promise to ‘socialise’ the production of coal, iron and steel, energy, chemicals, basic building 
materials, large banks and insurance companies.  Moreover, it remained prepared to trade the 
new Federal Republic’s western political orientation for neutrality if this was the price to be paid 
for a united Germany. 
 
In political terms, therefore, the new Federal Republic was a foreign country that was very much 
not made in the SPD’s image: a truth that was hammered home by a string of election defeats, 
not just in 1949, but also again in 1953 and 1957.  Eventually, this set in train a process of 
programmatic revision, culminating in the Bad Godesberg conference of 1959, which went 
beyond the kind of re-adaptation that the CDU would undergo in the late 1960s and 1970s and 
involved the revision of the party’s fundamental beliefs. The Bad Godesberg Programme 
rejected Marxism and re-framed the SPD’s core principles of democratic socialism within the 
wider context of Christian ethics, classical philosophy and humanism.  In doing so, the 
programme endorsed the political settlement in the Federal Republic and the centrality of the 
social market economy to it.  This was rule-taking in its purest form – in which the SPD 
accepted to all intents and purposes the entirety of a political settlement made in the 
CDU/CSU’s image.  And of course it meant an end to aspirations for radical socialism, 
neutrality, or German re-unification. 
 
The transformation of the SPD, as represented by the Bad Godesberg Programme, coincided 
with a generational change at the top of the party.  Now under the leadership of the charismatic 
Willy Brandt, the newly pragmatic SPD enjoyed a 10 per cent rise in popular support over the 
period 1957 to 1969.  In turn the combination of ideological moderation and rising electoral 
support eventually led to participation in government, first as junior partner to the Christian 
Democratic CDU in the Grand Coalition of 1966 to 1969, and then as senior partner to the 
liberal FDP in the Social-Liberal Coalition of 1969 to 1982.  To his credit, Brandt used his 
position first as Foreign Minister and subsequently as Chancellor effectively to embark on the 
one major constitutive process, comparable with the early moves of the Adenauer-Erhard 
partnership, in which the SPD could genuinely be considered to be rule-making; that of 
Ostpolitik.  Ostpolitik was transformative along three dimensions.  First, it had profound 
constitutional implications in that it explicitly ditched the Hallstein Doctrine that had helped 
define German foreign policy after 1949 and, in doing so, weakened the Federal Republic’s claim 
to be the one true German state.  Second, in the Federal Republic’s recognition of the GDR, 
expansion of trade links with COMECON, provisional recognition of the Oder-Neisse line and 
treaties with the Soviet Union, Ostpolitik fundamentally eased Cold War tensions and helped set 
in train processes – such as detente and the signing of the Helsinki accords – that would 
eventually end the division of Europe.  Finally, the process of Ostpolitik, although not opposed 
by the US, was very much a German-initiated undertaking, representing a confidence and 
independence that would have been impossible even a decade earlier and paving the way in 
procedural terms for the more assertive style of German foreign policy that Kohl would deploy 
during the process of unification twenty years later. 
 
Ostpolitik aside, however, the SPD’s approach to government over the period from 1969 to 1982 
was to work with the grain of the political settlement.  And, after the collapse of the Social-
Liberal coalition in 1982, the party would have to endure another 16 years in opposition before 
being returned to power following the 1998 Bundestag election.  In opposition it found itself 
once more having to react to developments over which it found little leverage.  The process of 
German unification has already been discussed but four other challenges are worth noting.  First, 
the SPD’s share of the vote in federal elections was in decline: from a high of 45.8 per cent in 
1972, it fell to 38.2 per cent in 1983, 37 per cent in 1987, and 33.5 per cent in 1990.  This trend 
was temporarily reversed under the leadership of Gerhard Schröder but has since continued, 
culminating in the historic low of 23 per cent in 2009.  Second, the emergence of the Greens in 
the early 1980s opened up a flank of political contestation along the materialist/post-materialist 
dimension and made it more difficult for the SPD to construct a coherent programme that 
engaged with the ‘new politics’28 without alienating the party’s core blue-collar vote.  Third, the 
SPD’s subsequent strategic dilemma was further complicated by the persistence, for reasons 
already discussed, of the PDS in the eastern states and its more recent incarnation as the core of 
the Left Party, which has so successfully mobilised around what was formerly part of the SPD’s 
core vote. Finally, with the exception of Gerhard Schröder, the SPD has failed to produce 
leaders of sufficient personal appeal or political acumen to match the likes of Helmut Kohl 
before 1998 or Angela Merkel since 2005.  Indeed, an analysis of the 2009 federal election 
debacle by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation reported that, although voters were in broad 
agreement with key aspects of the SPD’s 2009 programme, such as the introduction of minimum 
wage, the phase-out of nuclear energy, and tighter regulation of the financial markets, the party 
was not able to parlay this support into votes at the ballot box.29 
 
PATH-DEPENDENCE AND ELECTORAL ADVANTAGE 
So how are we to explain the CDU/CSU and SPD’s differing fortunes over time and the relative 
failure of the SPD to impose itself upon events in the manner of the CDU/CSU?  Let us return 
to the dichotomy between ‘structure-driven’ and ‘rule-driven’ path dependence posited earlier in 
this article.  As already discussed, structure-driven path dependence persists where existing 
structures impact on the choice and evolution of subsequent structures and is sustained through 
reasons of efficiency or because of rent seeking on the part of agents, whilst rule-driven path 
dependence exists when rules and practices are shaped by power relationships and is sustained 
through reasons of efficiency or because of interest group politics.  Let us deal with the 
efficiency arguments first. 
 
In the economics literature from which our framework is derived, an accepted notion of 
efficiency is that of ‘Pareto optimality’, used to describe situations in which any change that is 
made to make any agent better off is impossible without making another agent worse off.30  
Under conditions of Pareto Optimality, any changes to the status quo of agents’ welfare 
distributions would require the consent of all agents within the institution and possibly, where 
agents would be worse off in welfare terms, require their compensation as well. 
 
Without pursuing this argument to any great length, we can see how this notion of efficiency in 
the broad structures and power relations of the Federal Republic would constrain the SPD’s 
options.  As already noted, the SPD had little leverage over the early moves in the institutional 
development of the Federal Republic and its initial opposition to many of its key features, 
including the division of Germany, the Federal Republic’s western orientation and the social-
market economy, led to a series of defeats in federal elections.  As a result, it had to undergo the 
process of adaptation that culminated in the Bad Godesberg Programme.  Moreover, by the time 
the SPD had become the senior partner in the Federal Government in 1969, even the newest of 
these structures were at least two decades old and reasonably embedded and efficient.  Thus, 
even if the SPD was minded to – and, for reasons to be discussed below, it was not so minded – 
there was no chance of the party winning the consent of all key political agents in any 
transformative change. 
 
By contrast, the arguments for the efficiency of rule-driven path-dependence are weaker, 
particularly with regard to those rules that shape and structure political competition.  Formal 
rules that help determine outcomes obviously include Germany’s Mixed Member Proportional 
Voting System (MMP), and the ‘five per cent barrier’ to representation, as well as various 
constitutional constraints upon party organisation and activity31 and also encompasses all of the 
principles or regulations governing the conduct, actions, procedures, and arrangements that 
underpin the process through which parties seek votes and office.  And, if we do regard political 
parties as vote- and office-seeking, then a good proxy indicator of parties’ welfare are the 
Banzhaf scores32 generated by the outcomes of federal elections since 1949.  Banzhaf scores 
measure potential voting power33 in terms of the coalitions that can form, given the distribution 
of party weights in a given legislature.  Banzhaf scores for the main political parties in the 
Bundestag over the period 1949-2009 are set out in Table Two. 
 
TABLE TWO ABOUT HERE 
 
Table Two demonstrates that the pattern of distribution of welfare can be divided into three 
phases.  The first phase coincides with the party system consolidation discussed earlier and is 
characterised by fluctuating Banzhaf scores, culminating in the 1957 federal election, in which 
the CDU/CSU, SPD, and FDP all enjoyed scores of 0.1.  This is followed by a second phase, 
notable for its stability, in which there are only three parties in the Bundestag and they all have 
scores of 0.3333.  This period, the high-point of the triangular party system described in the 
‘Pappi model’34, encompasses six federal elections from 1961 until 1980 and – given the stable 
equity of Banzhaf scores - can arguably be described as Pareto Optimal.  The third phase, 
however, coincides with two historic junctures within the German party system: the emergence 
of the Greens as a national force following the 1983 federal election and the entry of the PDS.  
What follows is a period of trendless fluctuation in the relative Banzhaf scores - and therefore 
the distribution of welfare - of all political parties.  There are instances in which either the 
CDU/CSU (after the four successive federal elections between 1983 and 1994, as well as after 
the 2009 election) or the SPD (after the 1998 federal election) enjoy enhanced welfare and 
therefore a tactical advantage, as well as others (after the 2002 and 2005 elections) in which their 
welfare functions are broadly similar.  But what the institution of the German party system in 
this third phase clearly is not is ‘efficient’ in the manner used in this article. 
 
If we are to move towards a fuller understanding of path-dependency in German party politics, 
therefore, we must look beyond the notion of efficiency to the more agential explanations 
posited in our framework: those of rent-seeking and interest-group politics.  As already 
discussed, the incentives to continue rent seeking are powerful, even when institutional efficiency 
is in decline.  Similar incentives are at work when public-regarding decisions to break path-
dependence are thwarted by interest group politics. 
 
First, let us consider rent-seeking.  The rationale for, and evidence of, rent-seeking by political 
parties in most polities is fairly self-evident35.  In the Federal Republic, however, there are a 
number of historical conditions that make the incentives for rent-seeking particularly strong.  As 
already noted, Article 21 of the Basic Law constructed a new norm of state power in Germany in 
which state legitimacy was directly linked to the legitimacy of the political parties.  The privileged 
position enjoyed by the political parties led to what Wiesendahl36 has famously described as a 
‘modernisation trap’ in which party identities blurred and politics increasingly became the 
preserve of a cosseted world of ‘cliques, cabals, and careers’.37  The co-option of the political 
class into the state made rent-seeking increasingly rational for political agents, not least for the 
SPD, where the previously Marxist-informed ideology of evolutionary social transformation 
moderated into one of technocratic welfarism.  The SPD’s capacity for rent-seeking was 
especially evident in those states, such as North Rhine-Westphalia and Berlin, where the Social 
Democrats were often the governing party and achieved significant penetration of senior civil 
service and other public positions.38  Under such circumstances, even prolonged periods of 
opposition at the federal level were not without their compensations.39 
 
Many of the arguments behind the notion of rent-seeking as a buffer of structure-driven path-
dependence are straightforward and have been put forward in a different form in Katz and 
Mair’s notion of the ‘Cartel-party’.40  More difficult to establish is the second notion of interest-
group politics as a buffer for rule-driven path-dependence.  We have already mentioned the 
more formal rules that shape political competition in the Federal Republic.  However, a recent 
comparative analysis of coalition outcomes in Germany and New Zealand (a country with an 
MMP system modelled on Germany’s and a similar distribution of party weights), drawing upon 
the coalition theory literature, identified a number of more informal rules, norms and SOPs that 
had a material effect on coalition outcomes.  These include (1) the absence or presence of a rule 
or norm regarding majority rule, (2) a tendency towards minimum-connected winning coalitions, 
(3) the presence within coalitions of the party controlling the median legislator within the 
legislature, and (4) the key role of the party controlling the median legislator within the coalition. 
In the German case, (1), (3), and (4) were particularly salient, albeit skewed through the ongoing 
status of the Left Party as a ‘dummy’ in coalition calculations.41 
 
It is this exclusion of the Left Party from the coalition game in particular that the SPD must 
address if it is to overcome path-dependence and begin to shape its political environment in the 
manner of the CDU/CSU.  Twenty years after unification, what is now the Left Party42 has not 
gone away; on the contrary the 2009 federal election result was its best electoral performance to 
date and it now also enjoys a degree of penetration into the western states of Germany.  Other 
mainstream parties no longer use the explicit language of the past, when labels such as ‘ex-Stasi’, 
the ‘Eastern League’, the ‘nostalgic association’, or even ‘Red Polished Fascists’ were deployed to 
demonise what was then the PDS and deter its voters, and there is now a tacit acceptance that 
the Left Party is a fixture of the German party system for the time being.  However, this 
acceptance does not extend to including the Left Party in real-world coalition calculations at the 
federal level, despite a record of relatively successful co-operation between the SPD and Left 
Party in the eastern states, including Berlin.  This pattern of co-operation at the Land level, 
balanced by a frostiness at the federal level, is reminiscent of the 15-year process that preceded 
the formation of the Red-Green coalition in 1998.43  As with the Greens, there are certain policy 
positions (such as hostility to NATO) that the Left Party would have to moderate or downplay 
in order to become a feasible coalition partner in federal government.  Where the parallel 
between the Left Party and the Greens breaks down, however, is that whereas opposition to the 
integration of the Greens soon lost its emotional edge and came to focus on concrete policy 
differences, disapproval of the Left Party still possesses a visceral quality that defies rational 
calculation.  Within the SPD, this emotiveness has either harked back to institutional memories 
of the Zwangsvereinigung and its aftermath or is grounded in a more general disapproval of the 
GDR regime from which the PDS originally emerged.  More recently SPD opposition to 
engagement with the Left Party has fixated on the role of Oskar Lafontaine, considered a 
turncoat by many SPD activists. 
 
In short, rule-driven path-dependence has imposed limits on engagement with the Left Party and 
the reasons for its persistence lie in what Bebchuck and Roe refer to as interest group politics44.  
So which actors benefit from the status quo?  Clearly, the ongoing exclusion of the Left Party 
from the coalition game is to the benefit of the bourgeois parties as it limits the SPD’s coalition 
options.  This was particularly the case following the 2005 federal election, when a Red-Red-
Green coalition would have constituted the minimum-connected-winning coalition, within which 
the SPD would have controlled the median legislator: a much stronger role than it eventually 
enjoyed as junior partner in a surplus majority Grand Coalition. 
 
For the right-wing of the SPD as well, a very narrow conception of inner-party factional 
advantage might also make it rational to oppose engagement with the Left Party.  For inevitably 
such a process of engagement would mean a degree of programmatic re-orientation towards the 
left.  However, in the broadest terms it has been apparent since the mid-1990s45 that the SPD 
can and should more fully engage with what is now the Left Party.  Beyond the greater coalition 
options that would be made available to the SPD as a result, such a strategy would provide a 
clearer choice to voters and enhance the notion of responsible government in German politics.  
This is not without its electoral risks but would be preferable to the SPD’s only other coalition 
option at present or in the near future: another surplus majority Grand Coalition. 
 
So to sum up, although interest group politics buffer rule-driven path-dependence they are not 
an insurmountable barrier to change.  In order to break with path-dependence the SPD must 
display the same capacity for political agency shown by the CDU, for instance when it co-opted 
its sister party in the GDR, despite the latter’s long-standing and ongoing links with the 
Communist regime.  An active and constructive engagement with the Left Party 20 years after 
the fall of the GDR is relatively orthodox by comparison and for the SPD would be a first step 
along the road back to political power on its own terms. 
 
CONCLUSION 
This article has worked from the premise that, despite a steady decline in the Volkspartei vote, 
and the poor performance of the SPD in particular, party system change has in many ways 
enhanced the coalition options available to the Volksparteien.  It works from the argument that, 
despite the relative electoral strength of the CDU/CSU and SPD in the 1960s and 1970s, they 
were nearly always forced to bargain with the FDP, which acted as the ‘kingmaker’ within the 
party system and consequently was decisive in the coalition game.  By contrast, the article argues 
that under the current more fluid conditions, the Volksparteien are in principle less vulnerable to 
threats of a decisive defection by small parties to alternative coalitions.  This has generated more 
strategic options for the Volksparteien, albeit options that the CDU/CSU is better placed to take 
advantage of than the SPD.  This is because the CDU/CSU has been and remains more capable 
of shaping German party politics, whereas the SPD has internalised a more reactive role, for the 
reasons – related to the persistence of structure-driven and rule-driven path-dependence – 
discussed above. 
 
So where does this leave us?  It will be recalled that at the start of this article I argued that, when 
strategic opportunities arise, political agents must be able to (1) identify these as opportunities 
rather than threats; (2) possess the political skills and acumen effectively to pursue them; and (3) 
enjoy sufficient resources to overcome constraints on agents’ strategic potential.  I argued that 
when all three of these factors are in alignment then agents can ‘make the political weather’. 
When they are not, as the current predicament of the SPD demonstrates, then all bets are off. 
 
There are, however, two additional points that are worth bearing in mind.  First, although the 
SPD’s failure is undeniable, it is not necessarily worse than the failure suffered by many centre-
left parties in advanced democracies.  Indeed, with the exception of the Australian Labor Party 
(ALP) and, it might be argued, the US Democrats, very few such parties have benefited from the 
global financial crisis, regardless of whether they have been incumbents or in opposition.  
Moreover, with the exception of the ALP or the Swedish Social Democrats, most centre-left 
parties in advanced democracies have tended to be reactive and adaptive rather than take on the 
role of proactive institutional architects.  One might argue that such a reactive role is, as it were, 
one of the features that define social democracy.46 
 The second point is that all but the most ‘vulgar’ readings of path-dependence allow for the 
change and the potential for agents to shape and, under certain circumstances, transform the 
institutional environment within which they operate.  Clearly, this is empirically the case and is 
not a lesson that the CDU/CSU has had to learn.  It is, however, one that the SPD must more 
fully take on board if it is once more to become a progressive force in German politics.  Like the 
CDU/CSU, the SPD must learn to show a little less respect for the institutional setting in which 
it operates and a little less deference towards the rules, norms, beliefs and practices that hold it 
back. 
 
TABLE ONE: TYPES OF PATH-DEPENDENCE AND WHY THEY PERSIST 
Type of path dependence Reasons for path dependence 
Structure-driven Efficiency/Rent-seeking 
Rule-driven  Efficiency/Interest group politics 
Source: after Bebchuck and Roe (1999) 
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TABLE TWO: INSTITUTIONAL EFFICIENCY EXPRESSED BY STANDARDISED 
BANZHAF SCORES FOR THE MAIN POLITICAL PARTIES FOLLOWING GERMAN 
FEDERAL ELECTIONS, 1949-2009 
Year Party Efficiency 
CDU/CS
U 
SPD FDP Greens PDS/Left 
Party 
1949 0.3082 0.2594 0.2373 ___ ___ Increasing 
1953 0.75 0.05 0.05 ___ ___ 
1957 0.1 0.1 0.1 ___ ___ 
1961 0.3333 0.3333 0.3333 ___ ___ Pareto Optimal 
1965 0.3333 0.3333 0.3333 ___ ___ 
1969 0.3333 0.3333 0.3333 ___ ___ 
1972 0.3333 0.3333 0.3333 ___ ___ 
1976 0.3333 0.3333 0.3333 ___ ___ 
1980 0.3333 0.3333 0.3333 ___ ___ 
1983 0.5 0.1667 0.1667 0.1667 ___ Decreasing 
1987 0.5 0.1667 0.1667 0.1667 ___ 
1990 0.5 0.1667 0.1667 0 0.1667 
1994 0.5 0.1667 0.1667 0.1667 0 
1998 0.1667 0.5 0.1667 0.1667 0 
2002 0.3333 0.3333 0 0.3333 0 
2005 0.5 0.5 0.25 0.25 0.25 
2009 0.5 0.1667 0.1667 0 0.1667 
Source: calculated from data sourced at http://www.wahlrecht.de 
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